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WILL DIVERSITY REGULATIONS
DISADVANTAGE HUMAN EMBRYONIC
STEM CELL RESEARCH: A COMPARISON




Human Embryonic Stem Cell holds the promise to produce nu-
merous advances in medical areas, including stem cell therapy, ar-
tificial blood and tissue transplantation. However, conflicts arise
between the patentability and morality of HESC across various ju-
risdictions. The increased diversity in protecting improvements
from research is deemed to be the obstacle of technology develop-
ment in the field of HESC industry. This article evaluates the mode
of restrictive policies in EU and liberal policies in US, and con-
cludes that the uniform regulation would be impossible to deter-
mine. The adequate diversion should not be a threat to HESC in-
dustry and space for flexibility should be left in HESC regulation.
* Li Jiang holds a Ph.D. from Bangor University Law School, a LL.M
from Shandong University, and a B.S. in Biotechnology from University of Sci-
ence and Technology Beijing. The author would like to thank Dr. Wei Shi for
his encouragement. The author would also like to thank the editors of DePaul
Journal of Art, Technology and Intellectual Property Law.
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The regulatory regime in Human Embryonic Stem Cell (HESC)
research is a mixed landscape. Areas differ significantly in issues
such as moral standards and patents. There is growing concern that
"inconsistent regimes within legal jurisdictions have the potential
to put researchers in unusually precarious positions with respect to
their research methodology and output."' Consequently, it is worth
considering whether inconsistent regulations truly hamper techno-
logical advances. The diversity between regulations may have
costs but can also "enable systems to find novel and breakthrough
solutions, and it can add to their value and robustness."2 This arti-
cle provides a review of two major jurisdictions, the United States
(US) and the European Union (EU), to address the issue of incon-
sistent HESC regulations. By comparing the EU's restrictive envi-
ronment with the US's liberal environment, this article concludes
adequate flexibility and diversity in the field of HESC regulation
are beneficial to HESC research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology raises many controversies particularly in the area
of HESC research.' As one of the most fascinating developments
1. C J Murdoch, Intraoperability Problems: Inconsistent Stem Cell IP and Re-
search Regimes within Nations, 3 STANFORD JOURNAL OF LAW SCIENCE &
POLICY 49, 55 (2011).
2. Owen C.B. Hughes, et al., United States Regulation of Stem cell Research:
Recasting Government's Role and Questions to be Resolved, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 383, 443 (2008).
3. See Denis Schertenleib, The Patentability and Protection of DNA Based
Inventions in the EPO and the European Union, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
125-138 (2003) (observing that we are faced with a new technology. Its com-
plexity, however, poses problems which could never have been envisaged when
patent law developed.); see also Graeme Laurie, Patenting Stem Cells of Human
Origin, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 59-66 (2004) (stating that inventions in-
volving embryonic stem cells are but the first in a long line of controversial pa-
tent applications that are set to beleaguer the patent offices of Europe.); Stephen
R Crespi, The Human Embryo and Patent Law - A Major Challenge Ahead, 28
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 569-575 (2006) (pointing out that beginning with the
once controversial issue of micro-organism patenting, the debate soon extended
into the sphere of higher life forms, including cell-lines, plants, and animals and
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in the biomedical area over the past decade, HESC research holds
various potential in tissue engineering, genetic engineering, and
other regenerating technology. With huge scientific, medical and
commercial interest behind it, most countries commit to securing a
competitive position in the field of HESC research, transplanta-
tion, and regeneration medicine. Tremendous amounts of money
are spent on human embryonic stem cell research 4. However, alt-
hough a bright future of HESC research in conquering incurable
diseases has been revealed its development faces many legal and
ethical challenges.' The complexity of human embryonic stem cell
research creates a variety of unusual and fraught situations for reg-
ulators.
Considering the morality and patentability of HESC research,
interoperability and intraoperability problems occur within and
across nations. 6 HESC regulation is divergent both within the EU
and US. These internal and external inconsistencies of HESC regu-
lation continue to impede biotechnology advances. The nature of
HESC research highlights difficulties lawmakers and scientists
face with international collaborations involving various research-
ers under conflicting policy regimes. Although HESC technology
is young, the intrinsic nature of this area has generated a high level
of international collaboration from its conception. 7 It is argued that
then even more controversially into the fundamental issue of gene patents,
which may still need to achieve its final settlement).
4. In fiscal 2010, National Institute of Health, which is funded by the gov-
ernment, spent about $200 million to fund more than 200 human embryo re-
search grants. U.S. Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research Can Continue, Ap-
peals Court Says, Bloomberg.com, April 29, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-29/stem-cell-research-funding-can-
continue-during-legal-case-u-s-court-says.html (last visited April 4, 2012).
5. See supra, note 3.
6. See Murdoch, supra, note 1.
7. Jingyuan Luo, et al., International Collaboration: How Disparate Policies
between the United States and the United Kingdom Impact Research, 6 PLOS
ONE, 1, 7 (March 8, 2011). (The study examined the impact of collaboration on
publication significance in the US and UK and reviewed publications by US and
UK authors from 2008 along with their citation rates and the political factors
that may have contributed to the number of international collaboration. The re-
sults shows that the UK exhibited a higher proportion of international publica-
tions than the US, this difference was consistent with overall trends in interna-
3
Jiang: Will Diversity Regulations Disadvantage Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXV: 53
"variance within a jurisdiction seems much more likely to produce
confusion and inefficiency" and is an argument proven true by the
disparity in HESC regulations.8 The diversity of regulations and
policies in this area often create confusion, which impacts HESC
research and its outcome.9
This article argues the diversity between countries can be hope
for the improvement of HESC regulation. Part I of the article will
examine the EU and its member states' HESC regulations. EU at-
tempted to harmonise the HESC regulation through EU Biotech-
nology Directive (Directive) and European Patent Convention
(EPC). However, Member States adopted the divergent interpreta-
tions of Directive and EPC. Part I argues that even if the EU has
reached the compromise in the community towards the HESC reg-
ulation, inevitably Member States interpret diversely in national
jurisdiction. In the context of comparative law, Part II of this arti-
cle will explore current federal and state HESC regulations in the
US. Part II argues the diversity of regulations at the state level
compensates for the absence of uniform regulations in federal lev-
el. Through comparing the restrictive legal framework in the EU
with the liberal legal framework in the US, this article finally con-
cludes that the diversity in HESC regulation is inevitable at the
state level. Legal reconciliation is essential, whereas legal diversity
is inevitable.
tional scientific collaboration. The result shows that the characteristics of a suc-
cessful collaboration is crucial to maximizing the resources available for stem
cell research and advancing this scientific field).
8. See Murdoch, supra, note 1.
9. Denise Stevens, Embryonic Stem Cell Research: Will President Bush's
Limitation on Federal Funding Put the United States at a Disadvantage? A
Comparision between US and International Law, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 623-654
(2003) (observing that the disparities among the laws of the various countries
could have a profound impact on embryonic stem cell research; the Disparities
between countries in stem cell laws could put the United States at a technologi-
cal and Economic disadvantage).
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II. EU: A RESTRICTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITH VARIOUS
REGULATIONS IN MEMBER STATES
The margin of appreciation principle, which was developed in
case Vo v. France,'0 allows different interpretations of human em-
bryo based on various cultural, philosophical, and cultural circum-
stance." However, Member States do not have power to define the
embryo.' 2 Moreover, Evans v United Kingdom3 clarifies that no
uniform legal status exists for human embryos in the EU. The lack
of uniform moral definition and legal status of human embryos re-
sults in member states' doubt of whether the organism is a human
embryo. 14
A. European Patent Convention (EPC) and the Directive 98/44/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Directive):
Harmonisation Attempt
The EPC and the Directive is seen as an attempt to harmonize
the patentability of biotechnology invention in the EU. 15
The patent protection of HESC research also stemmed from the
EPC, which is an intergovernmental agreement between 38 Euro-
10. Vo v. France, (Application No 53924/00) GC, 2004, at para. 83 and 40
11. Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in In-
ternational Law?, 16 EUR. J. INTER'L L. 907 (2005).
12. Recital 14 of the Directive provides that "whereas, consequently, sub-
stantive patent law cannot serve to place or render superfluous national, Europe-
an or international law which may impose restrictions or prohibitions or which
concerns the monitoring of research and of the use or commercialization of its
results, notably from the point of view of the requirements of public health,
safety, environmental protection, animal welfare, the preservation of genetic di-
versity and compliance with certain ethical standards."
13. Evans v. UK (Application No 6339/05) the European Court of Human
Rights (2006).
14. Aurora Plomer, Stem Cell Patents: European Patent Law and Ethics Re-
port, reports for FP6 'Life sciences, genomics and biotechnology for health'
SSA, 89 (2006).
15. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (July
6, 1998). Recital 3 of the EU Biotechnology Directive provides that whereas
effective and harmonized protection throughout the Member States is essential
in order to maintain and encourage investment in the field of biotechnology.
5
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pean states for the purpose of harmonizing patent law throughout
the EU.' 6 Notably, the members of the EPC not only include EU
members but also non-EU members. 7 The European Patent Office
established by the EPC is responsible for granting the European
patent. However, the EPC is limited to the ability to grant patents,
and its rights are not extended to the legal effect of a patent. 8 The
European patent is 'a bundle of national patent' and is valid among
the countries where patent application is filed.'9
Unlike the patent laws in the US, the EPC contains a clause re-
lated to the morality of the claimed invention.2 0 Under this provi-
sion, even if an invention fulfills the requirements of novelty, in-
ventiveness, and sufficient disclosure, a patent can still be rejected
if it is contrary to the "order public" or morality. This moral exclu-
sion is often utilized by animal rights campaigners, Greenpeace, or
other similar institutions to oppose certain Biotechnology patents
granted by the EPO.2 1
To harmonize the patentability of biotechnological products and
processes throughout Europe, the July 6, 1998 Directive 98/44/EC
of the European Parliament on the legal protection of biotechno-
logical inventions (the Directive) was enacted, establishing morali-
ty as an evaluative criterion in the granting of patents. The Di-
rective was the result of ten years of difficult negotiations over the
16. The European Patent Convention is the Convention on the Grant of Eu-
ropean Patents. European Patent Convention, 15th ed. (October 2013) available
at, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/epc.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
17. Id.
18. See Plomer, supra, note 14.
19. Supra, note 16. Article 64(1) of the EPC provides that 'a European pa-
tent shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, confer on its proprietor from
the date on which the mention of its grant is published in the European Patent
Bulletin, in each contracting state in respect of which it is granted, the same
rights as would be conferred by a national patent granted in that state'.
20. Supra, note 16. Article 53(a) of the EPC provides that: European patents
shall not be granted for: (a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which
would be contrary to 'order public' or morality, provided that exploitation shall
not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or
regulation in some or all of the Contracting States.
21. See, Howard Florey Institute/Relaxin, EPO 6/1995 388;
HARVARD/Onco-mouse, T19/90, (1990); see also Crespi, supra note 3.
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general principles of biotechnological patents.22 In 1988, the Euro-
pean Parliament rejected an earlier proposed Directive because it
lacked moral aspects, particularly in its provision on the patenta-
bility of materials derived from human beings. 23 However, the pur-
pose of the Directive, as stated by the European Commission, is to
"foster the overall innovatory potential and competitiveness of
Community science and industry in this important field of modem
technology." 4
The EU Commission believed that the Directive, as a uniform
biotechnology regulation, was important to the development of bi-
otechnology in the common market. 25 The commission also recog-
nized that harmonization of biotechnology patenting is not con-
fined to the technical dimension but also presents ethical
concerns. 26 Therefore, from 1989-1995, the draft Directive intro-
duced ethical elements, such as respect for animal suffering, the
non-patentability of human beings, and the safety of genetically
engineered products.27 Among these ethical elements, Parliament
was particularly concerned by the patentability of the human body
and its components; consequently, an amendment was added to
exclusively prohibit the grant of patents to the human body or its
components. 21 In the face of competition from the US and Japan,
the Directive was finally sent to the Council and the Parliament in
1996.29
22. Plomer Auroar & Paul Torremans (eds.), Embryonic Stem Cell Patents:
European Law and Ethics, MODERN L. REv., 1St ed., pp. 16-124 Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2009).
23. Proposal for a Parliament and Council Directive on the Legal Protection





27. Richard E Gold and Alain Gallochat, The European Biotech Directive:
Past as Prologue, 7 EUR. L. J. pp. 331-366 (2007).
28. Id.
29. European Commission, Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee
on the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, OJ C 295/1 Vol. 39 (1996).
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The Parliament reviewed the amended Directive and affirmed its
amendments. The Directive was eventually approved in 1998.30
The Directive stressed the importance of both patents and morali-
ty.3 This provision is similar to Article 53(a) of the EPC.32 After
the Directive was issued, the EPC introduced a new chapter to ac-
cord with the Directive. 33 Rule 23(d) of the EPC stated that "under
Article 53(a), European patents shall not be granted in respect of
biotechnological inventions which, in particular, concern the fol-
lowing: uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial pur-
poses. 3
4
The Directive first excluded "uses of human embryos for indus-
trial or commercial purposes" from patenting. 35 Although the orig-
inal intention of listing unpatentable inventions is to clarify the
30. Press Release, Environmental Council, 2 106th session (June 16, 1998),
available at, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releasePRES-98-205_en.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2015).
31. Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that inventions shall be considered
unpatentable when their commercial exploitation would be contrary to public
order or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary
merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation.
32. Supra, note 16. Article 53 of the Directive provides that European pa-
tents shall not be granted in respect of (a) inventions the commercial exploita-
tion of which would be contrary to "order public or morality; such exploitation
shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or
regulation in some or all of the contracting states.
33. EPC and EU Biotech Patents Directive 98/44/EC, European Patent Con-
vention, R. 23(b). Rule 23(b) of the EPC provides that 'for European patent ap-
plications and patents concerning biotechnological inventions, the relevant pro-
visions of the Convention shall be applied and interpreted in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter. Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal
protection for biotechnological inventions shall be used as supplementary means
of interpretation in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
34. EPC and EU Biotech Patents Directive 98/44/EC, European Patent Con-
vention, R. 23(e). Rule 23(e) of the EPC provides that: (I) The human body, at
the various stages of its formation and development ... cannot constitute patent-
able inventions, (2) An element isolated from the human body or otherwise pro-
duced by means of a technical process ... may constitute a patentable invention,
even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element.
35. EPC and EU Biotech Patents Directive 98/44/EC Article 6(2) (1998).
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regulation36 , its practical ramifications are ambiguous and mislead-
ing.37 The moral provisions set out in the Directive also created
some discomfort among member states, for example, in the case
The Netherlands (Italy and Norway, intervening) v. European Par-
liament and E. U. Council (E.C. Commission, intervening).38 The
Netherlands presented six arguments to revoke the Directive.3 9 The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that member states are re-
sponsible for assessing the morality of patents in the terms of "the
ethical, sociological, or philosophical context of each country."40
The court also affirmed that the [D]irective is a necessary harmo-
nization measure to eliminate biotechnology regulation disparities
among member states. However, the intention of the EPC and the
Directive is merely to make the uniform pre-grant phase. 4' No
formal harmonization of regulations is achieved by the EPC and
the Directive. 42
B. Member States: Divergent Interpretations and Disparities
Policies
Based on their different scientific, economic and moral ambi-
tions, Member states have adopted different approaches in inter-
36. The EPO guidelines state that the purpose of this provision is to "deny
protection to inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder, or to lead to
criminal or other generally offensive behavior." EPO Guidelines C-IV. 4.1.
37. Amina Agovic, Stem Cell Patents on a Knife Edge, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
& PRACTICE 718 (2008).
38. Kingdom of Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of Europe-
an Union, C-377/98, [2001] 3 CMLR 49.
39. Id. Six pleas include: (1) that it is incorrectly based on Article 100a (now
Article 95) of the Treaty; (2) that it is contrary to the principle of subsidiarity;
(3) that it infringes the principle of legal certainty; (4) that it is incompatible
with international obligations; (5) that it breaches fundamental rights; and (6)
that the procedure for its adoption was incorrect.
40. Supra, note 21.
41. See Plomer, supra, note 14 (pointing out that the objectives of the EPC
and the EPO indicate clearly the intent of the founders was to achieve uniformi-
ty only in the pre-grant phase and to limit the influence of the EPC in the post-
grant phase only to certain standard rules, leaving the rest to the national patent
law of the contracting states).
42. Id.
9
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preting Article 53(a) of the EPC. In the plurality view, some states
have heightened moral concerns, while others focus on the com-
mercial applications. Member states such as France, Italy, and the
UK use the same wording in their own laws as the EPC's Di-
rective 3.4 However, some states use the wording to broaden the Di-
rective's moral exclusion.44 Nevertheless, the overview of policies
in member states reveals a patchwork of disparate regulations on
the patentability of HESC.
1. Permissive Policy: UK Approach
The rational reason for a permissive policy is to advance scien-
tific study that enables society to conquer diseases, benefitting all
of society.45 In the EU, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, and so
on all adopted a liberal policy towards HESC research. Despite
these countries' permissive policies, some core ethical principles,
such as human cloning, are not allowed. Similarly, human repro-
ductive materials cannot be commercialized in these countries.
As this article will analyze in the following section, this liberal
policy is well articulated in the UK's regulations.
a. From Warnock report to Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 1990: License Up to the Formation of the
Primitive Streak
The UK's regulatory system on HESC research is considered
one of the best in the world.46 Professor Anne Mclaren of the
43. Asa Hellstadius, A Comparative Analysis of the National implementation
of the Directive's Morality Clause, in Plomer Auroar & Paul Torremans,
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL PATENTS: EUROPEAN LAW AND ETHICS, 1st ed., Chapter
5, pp. 96-148 Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).
44. Id.
45. Bartha Maria Knopper, Genetic Technologies: Commercialization of Ge-
netic Research and Public Policy 286 Sci. 2277-2278 (1999).
46. UK Government Proposals for the Regulation of Hybrid and Chimera
Embryos, House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, March
2007, available at,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmsctech/272/27
202.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
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Wellcome Trust Gurdon Institute remarked that the "UK has a
sensible and scientifically based regulatory system that has func-
tioned with few major problems for the past sixteen years. '47 Alt-
hough both the US and the UK adopt permissive regulatory ap-
proaches to HESC research, the US model does not seem
appropriate for the UK's moral atmosphere. 41 Within Europe, the
UK's liberal approach was strongly criticized by opponents.
49
The Warnock report discussed two extreme views: (1) religious
members of the Catholic Church who believe that the human em-
bryo has human status and (2) utilitarians who insist that the hu-
man embryo has no moral status. 0 Bypassing the fundamental
question of whether an embryo is a human being, the highlight of
the Warnock report is its endorsement of the view that a human
embryo has a special moral status and that its particular status de-
pends on its stage of development." The Warnock report suggests
that HESC research should be prohibited when cell differentiation
has occurred after 14 days and the appearance of the primitive
streak. 2 The UK legislature generally accepted HESC research us-
ing either embryos created for research or IVF waste embryos
5 3
47. Id.
48. Aurora Plomer, Beyond the HFE Act 1990: The Regulation of Stem Cell
Research in the UK, 10 Med. L. Rev., Summer ed. pp. 132-164 (2002) (stating
that in the absence of a clear parliamentary intent by the UK parliament in 1990
to adopt moral principles endorsing the use of cloning techniques in embryo re-
search, it is unclear how a judge can reach out into the past to identify all-
embracing moral principles which could extend to novel and morally contested
issues without inviting criticisms of abuse of judicial process and usurpation of
the legislative function).
49. Jan Deckers, Why Eberl is Wrong: reflections on the Beginning of Per-
sonhood, 21 BIOETHICs 270 (2007).
50. Supra note 3.
51. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embry-
ology, The Wamock Report, 1984, available at,
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2068.html (last visited January 19, 2012).
52. Supra, note 3.
53. Because the proportion of successful IVF is at best 20-25% successful,
doctors must produce many surplus embryos. These embryos are byproducts of
IVF and are usually discarded or destroyed.
11
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and agreed that embryos used in research should be no older than
14 days.5 4
Based on the Warnock report, the Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Act (HFE Act) was passed in 1990. Because the huge po-
tential of HESC was not foreseen at the time of passage of the
HFE Act, it could be judged as accidental rather than by design
that embryo research is permitted under the Act. 5 According to
Schedule 2, section 3 (1), the legitimate purposes for which re-
search could be licensed:
(a) Promoting advances in the treatment of infertili-
ty, (b) increasing knowledge about the causes of
congenital disease, (c) increasing knowledge about
the causes of miscarriages, (d) developing more ef-
fective techniques of contraception, or (e) develop-
ing methods for detecting the presence of gene or
chromosome abnormalities in embryos before im-
plantation. 6
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA)
was created by the HFE Act. 7 The HFEA is one of five critical
54. There are four main views accepted by UK legislators: "argument from
suffering justifies embryo research because of its potential to assist the devel-
opment of treatments for disease"; "argument from twinning asserts that early
embryos cannot be considered human individuals because blastocysts can de-
velop into two human beings"; "the argument from capacities suggests that
since embryos lack the ability to think, act and communicate they cannot be ac-
corded full status as human beings"; "argument from potentiality accepts that
though the embryo has the potential to develop into a human being, this can on-
ly occur under specific circumstances and therefore it cannot be considered a
human being in itself'. Erica Haimes, Rouven Porz, Jackie Scully and Christoph
Rehmann Sutter, So What is an Embryo? A Comparative Study of the Views of
Those Asked to Donate Embryos for HESC Research in the UK and Switzer-
land, New Genetics and Society 27 (2008): 113.
55. Ryan Morgan, A Tight Fit? Deficiencies in the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Regulations 2001, 28 STATUTE L. REV. 199-217 (2007).
56. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act §3(1) schedule 2 (1990).
57. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (1990), available at,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/37/contents, (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
12
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regulatory bodies that make up the integral HESC regulatory
framework in the UK. 8 HFEA licenses and regulates embryo re-
search and UK fertility clinics. 9 Additionally, the Human Tissue
Authority (HTA) and UK Stem Cell Bank (UKSCB) are mainly
responsible for overseeing the deposit and use of embryos and
stem cell lines.60 The Gene Therapy Advisory Committee (GTAC)
and Medicine and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
(MHRA) are in charge of conducting clinical trials and investigat-
ing harmful accidents. 6' In light of the HFE Act of 1990, the UK is
the only country in Europe that allows embryos to be created for
research purposes.
b. Whether a human embryo created by Cell Nuclear
Replacement (CNR) is an Embryo Defined by the HFE Act
1990?
The HFE Act of 1990 was initially passed to settle the dispute
over In Vitro Fertilization (IVF). 62 However, Dolly's birth prompt-
ed questions about whether HESC research in Cell Nuclear Re-
placement (CNR) fell within the scope of the HFE Act.63 Faced
58. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA); Human Tissue
Authority (HTA), Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
(MHRA); Gene Therapy Advisory Committee (GTAC); UK Stem Cell Bank
Steering Committee (UKSCB).
59. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
60. Human Tissue Authority, http://www.hta.gov.uk/ (last visited Feb. 22,
2015); UK Stem Cell Bank,
http://www.nibsc.org/science-and-research/advancedtherapies/uk_stem-cell-b
ank.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
61. Gene Therapy Advisory Committee,
http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/GTAC/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015); Medi-
cines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency,
http://www.mhra.gov.uk/#page=DynamicListMedicines (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
62. Aurora Plomer, Beyond the HFE Act of 1990: The Regulation of Stem
Cell Research in the UK, 10 MED. L. REV., Summer ed. pp. 132-264 (2002).
63. Dolly the sheep was the first mammal to be cloned from an adult somatic
cell using the process of nuclear transfer. Dolly (Sheep); Wikipedia.org, (Feb.
13
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with the possibilities of human cloning and tissue factories, the
HFEA collaborated with the Human Genetics Advisory Commis-
sion (HGAC) to address these questions. A joint report by the two
organizations stated that the HFE Act of 1990 was effective in re-
search involving CNR.64 The nuclear replacement of eggs is per-
mitted because it is not listed in the HFEA and the monitoring of
NCR is under the jurisdiction of the HFEA.65 During the same pe-
riod, Chief Medical Officer Professor Donaldson was commis-
sioned by the government and also reported beyond the legal scope
of the HFE Act of 1990. In the Donaldson Report, research involv-
ing NCR is allowed under the HFE Act of 1990 provided that "it is
for one of the existing specified research purpose. 6 6 Compared
with the joint report, the Donaldson report indicates embryos cre-
ated for research generate more moral objections than spare em-
bryos. 67 The report further proposed to "enact new legislation to
ban CNR for reproductive purposes. 68
Following these reports, Parliament approved the 2001 Human
Fertilization and Embryology (Research Purpose) Regulations to
extend the legitimate purposes under Schedule 2, Section 3(1) of
the HFE Act. Three conditions were added to obtain a license for
research: "(a) increasing knowledge about the development of em-
bryos; (b) increasing knowledge about serious disease; or (c) ena-
bling any such knowledge to be applied in developing treatments
22, 2015) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dolly_(sheep); see also Stevens, supra
note 9.
64. Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Science, and Medicine, www.gov.uk/dh
(2015), available at, http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/Archive/HGAC/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2015).
65. Id.
66. Stem Cell Research: Medical Progress with Responsibility, A Report
from the Chief Medical Officer's Expert Group Reviewing the Potential of De-
velopments in Stem Cell Research and Cell Nuclear Replacement to Benefit
Human Health, Department of Health (June 2000), available at,
http://www.lifecellinternational.com/downloads/whitepapers/stemcellresearch_
22.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
67. Id.
68. For reproductive purposes, CNR means that a cloned embryo could be
implanted in a womb and cloned fetus allowed to be born.
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for serious disease. ' 69 The regulation presents two clear deficien-
cies. First, according to the HFE Act of 1990, human cloning
could potentially be permitted in the UK.70 The public is uneasy
about cloning humans and believes that it should have been strictly
banned by regulation. However, the 2001 regulation does not
clearly outlaw the cloning of human embryos. Second, the defini-
tion of "serious disease" under Section 2(2)(c) might be narrowly
read to preclude conditions such as injury or trauma.72 Thus, some
important therapeutic cloning, such as production of skin tissue,
would not be allowed to develop in the UK.
Because the 2001 Regulation only extended the legitimate li-
cense purposes for HESC and did not answer the question of
whether human embryos created by CNR fell within the definition
of "embryo" under the HFE Act of 1990, the group Pro-life Alli-
ance brought a claim for judicial review.7 1 In Quintavalle v. Secre-
tary of State for Health, Judge Crane of the High Court held that
fertilization is essential to the definition of an embryo 74 and that an
organism produced by CNR does not have complete fertilization.
Therefore, the creation of human embryos through CNR falls out-
side the meaning of embryo in section 1 of the HFE Act of 1990. 71
Judge Crane also denied that section 3(3)(d) is effective in licens-
ing of CNR by reason of fertilization. 76
69. Human Fertilization and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations
2001 (S.I. 2001 No. 188), (accessed Jan. 22, 2012)
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/1 88/contents/made.
70. Public Perspective on Human Cloning, Wellcome Trust,
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/Publications/Reports/Public-
engagement/wtd003422.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
71. Id.
72. Roger Brownsword, Stem Cells, Superman, and the Report of the Select
Committee, 65 MODERN L. REv. pp. 568-587 (2002).
73. Lee Robert Gregory, Human Fertilization and Embryology: Regulating
the Reproductive Revolution, 1st ed., pp. 2-345 (Blackstone Press 2001).
74. Section l(l)(b) of the HFE Act of 1990 provides that "the meaning of
embryo, gamete and associated expressions in this Act, expect where otherwise
stated, references to an embryo include an egg in the process of fertilization."
HFE Act § l(1)(b).
75. Quintavalle v. Secretary of State for Health, 4 All E.R. 1013 (2001).
76. Section 3(3)(d) of HFE Act of 1990 provides that "a license cannot au-
thorize replacing a nucleus of a cell of an embryo with a nucleus taken from a
15
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Although Quintavalle's narrow interpretation of the HFE Act of
1990 seemed to be an exemplary judgment, it was reversed by the
Court of Appeal.77 First, the lords explained the consistency be-
tween the rules that "statutory language retain the meaning" and
that "a statute is always speaking" through the analogy that "[i]f
Parliament, passed an Act applicable to dogs, it could not properly
be interpreted to apply to cats; but it could properly be held to ap-
ply to animals which were not regarded as dogs when the Act was
passed but are so regarded now. 78 Additionally, the lords referred
to the ruling in Royal College of Nursing v. Department of Health
and Social Security7 9 that "when a new state of affairs, or a fresh
set of facts bearing on policy, comes into existence, the courts
have to consider whether they fall within the Parliamentary inten-
tion."80 The lords also noted the HFE Act was passed when em-
bryos could only be created by fertilization and that the definition
of embryo should be extended with the advance of technology. Fi-
nally, the court of appeals held that embryos created by CNR were
within the ambit of the HFE Act.8' Aurora Plomer, Professor of
University of Sheffield, concluded that the judicial attempts to
control HESC research under the HFE Act of 1990 exhibit "the
weaknesses and deficiencies of precipitated legal intervention."82
She suggested that the government, rather than the court, should be
responsible for reviewing the HFE Act.83 Plomer's opinion was
cited in the legal challenge to the patentability of research involved
human embryos.84
cell of any person embryo or subsequent development of an embryo." HFE Act
§3(3)(d).
77. Quintavalle v. Secretary of State for Health, [2003] UKHL 13.
78. Id.
79. Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v. Department of
Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800, [1981] 1 ALL ER 545 CA and HL
(E), [1981] 2 WLR 279, [1980] UKHL 10.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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c. Inventions Related HESC: Patentable or Non-patentable?
One main difficulty faced by the UK is the creation of a rule re-
garding the patentability of inventions involving HESC. The UK
Patent Act of 1977 was amended in 2000 to implement Article 1-
11 of the Directive. 5 The 1995 Patent Rule and Plant Variety
rights regulation was also changed to accord with Article 12-14 of
the Directive.8 6 In terms of HESC research, the question of how to
interpret Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive was left to the legisla-
tors.8 7 However, the 2000 patent regulation simply copied the
wording of Article 6(2) of the Directive and did not expressly list
the patentable inventions related to HESC. In 2003, the United
Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO) issued a practice
statement to clarify this Article, prohibiting patents on human em-
bryos or processes for deriving stem cells from a human being.88
Additionally, the approach adopted by the UKIPO is to exclude
totipotent stem cells 9 from patenting but to allow pluripotent stem
cells90 to be patented.91 The UKIPO noted that pluripotent cells
have no potential to develop into human beings; therefore, inven-
85. Patents, The Patent Regulation 2000 (SI 2000/2037).
86. The Patent Amendment Rules 2001 (SI 2001/1412) related to the deposit
of, access to and re-deposit of biological material. Article 13-14 of the EU Di-
rective; The Patents and Plant Variety Rights Regulations 2002 (S12002/247)
implemented Article 12 of the EU Directive.
87. Article 6(2)(c) of Directive provides that on the basis of paragraph 1, the
following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable (c) uses of human em-
bryos for industrial or commercial purposes.
88. Inventions involving human embryonic stem cells, the United Kingdom
Intellectual Property Office. See generally, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-
types/pro-patent/p-law/p-pn/p-pn-stemcells-20090203.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
89. Totipotent stem cells are one of the most important stem cells types be-
cause they have the potential to develop into any cell found in the human body.
See generally, http://www.explorestemcells.co.uk/TotipotentStemCells.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
90. Pluripotent stem cells have the potential to differentiate into almost any
cell in the body. See generally,
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tions involving these cells are not within the scope of moral viola-
tion.92 Aided by this narrow interpretation of the Directive, many
inventions related to HESC were granted patents in the UK. Ac-
cording to a survey, the UKIPO played a pioneering role in grant-
ing downstream HESC derivatives. 93 Considering the permissive
moral and legal culture in the UK, the UKIPO's interpretation of
Article 6(2)(c) seems proper and effective.
2. Prohibition Policy: German Approach
Countries that adopted policies of prohibition often hold the
opinion that human embryos have the status of human beings,
conveying their skepticism toward biotechnology development
through strict regulations. However, these strict regulations do not
necessarily prevent all HESC research in these countries. In coun-
tries adopting restrictive policies, inconsistency between regula-
tions and moral objectives might occur.94 In the EU, this approach
is widely accepted by Austria, Ireland, Italy and Germany.95
Among these countries, Germany offers a specific example of the
prohibitive approach. Influenced by the devaluation of life during
the Nazi era, the German constitution contains two provisions ex-
pressing the importance of human dignity.96 These provisions
could be viewed as the moral basis of the restrictive policy in
Germany. 97
a. Protect the Human Embryo but Allow Importation of
92. Paragraph 3 (a) of Schedule A2 to the Patent Act 1977.
93. A 2009 survey by A. Plomer showed that almost 100 patents were grant-
ed to UK or non-UK residents by UKIPO. See supra, note 40.
94. For example, scientists in Italy are allowed to use cell lines obtained from
abroad, which is against its moral value of the human embryo.
95. Rosario M. Isasi & Bartha M. Knoppers, Mind the Gap: Policy Ap-
proaches to Embryonic Stem Cell and Cloning Research in 50 Countries, 13
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW 9-26 (2006).
96. The protection of human dignity and the right to life.
97. Jan P Beckmann, On the German Debate on Human Embryonic Stem
Cell Research, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 603-621 (stating that Germany presents a ra-
ther special case in that the law strictly forbids any manipulation of the human
embryo that does not contribute to its development).
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Embryo Stem Cells From Abroad
German law is extremely restrictive of HESC research, as
demonstrated by the definition of embryo in the German Embryo
Protection Act (ESchG), which provides that "the fertilized human
ovum which is capable of development after the nuclei have
merged, also any totipotent cell extracted from an embryo capable
- under the right circumstances - of dividing and developing into
an individual. 98
According to the ESchG, to protect human embryos, egg dona-
tion, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)99 and cultivation of
more than three embryos are all prohibited. 0 However, the ESchG
does not prohibit research on already harvested HESC because it is
pluripotent. Interestingly, because embryo stem cells can only be
obtained by destroying embryos, it is paradoxical that the destruc-
tion of embryos is ethically forbidden while embryo stem cells are
legal. Consequently, the German Research Foundation (DFG) rec-
ommended importing pluripotent embryonic stem cells from
abroad. 10 The DFG believes that doing so is "in principle admissi-
ble" because German constitutional law has no legal force outside
of Germany. 102
The main remaining dispute concerns whether importing HESC
from abroad is allowable. A report by the Parliamentary Study
Commission on the Law and Ethics of Modem Medicine suggest-
ed that embryonic stem cells should be completely prohibited even
if they are imported from abroad. 03 However, the National Ethics
Council proposed that imports of embryonic stem cells should be
98. German Embryo Protection Act §8.
99. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is "a technique that enables
people with a specific inherited condition in their family to avoid passing it on
to their children. It involves checking the genes of embryos created through IVF
for this genetic condition". See PGD on Human Fertilization and Embryology
Authority.
100. The German Embryo Protection Act, Federal Law Gazette (December
1990).
101. Supra, note 96.
102. Id.
103. Parliamentary Study Commission on the Law and Ethics of Modem
Medicine's Report (n. 103) at 102.
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permitted for a period of three years under the condition that they
are strictly regulated.°4
In 2002, Germany's legislature passed the Stem Cell Act (StZG)
to "ensure the protection of embryos in connection with the impor-
tation and use of human embryonic stem cells."' 15 StZG provides
the basic principle that importation and use of embryonic stem
cells is forbidden. However, the StZG also decreed that imported
stem cells meeting the following conditions could be licensed: (1)
the stem cell lines were extracted from surplus embryos from in
vitro fertilizations in the country of origin before January 1, 2002;
(2) the persons entitled to disposal under the law of the country of
origin have properly consented to the extraction of stem cells; (3)
no remuneration or benefit in kind has been granted; (4) no other
regulations, especially those of the ESchG, are violated. 0 6
Without a license, importation or use of embryonic stem cells
may be treated as a criminal offense. 07 Through setting limitations
with a ban on importation and use of embryonic stem cells, 108
German HESC research can be conducted without the destruction
of embryos. German scientists need not move abroad to conduct
their research, and German companies can invest money in this re-
104. The National Council on Ethics which had been established by Chancel-
lor Gerhard Schroder in May 2001, offered four options: Option A (which
would entail a change in the Embryo Protection Act held the importing, the use,
and even he derivation of embryonic stem cells from super numerous embryos
to be ethically admissible, provided the research goals attainable by means of
these embryonic stem cell were not attainable by other, less questionable means.
Option B also favored the importing and use of HESC but opposed the deriva-
tion of stem cells in Germany. Option C favored a moratorium in order to clarify
important questions. Option D held the importing and use of HESC to be an il-
legitimate instrumentalization of human life and hence ethically inadmissible.
See National Ethics Council's Opinion at 17.
105. The official title of the Stem Cell Act is "Act to Secure the Protection of
Embryos in Connection with the Importing and Use of Human Embryonic Stem
Cells". See Jan P Beckmann, supra, note 88.
106. Stem Cell Act §4 para. 2.
107. Section 13 of the Stem Cell Act provides that "any person who imports
or uses embryonic stem cells without having obtained approved pursuant to par-
agraph I of section 6 above shall be punished with imprisonment of up to three
years or shall be fined." Stem Cell Act §13.
108. Supra, note 96.
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search. It is noteworthy that President George W. Bush also bor-
rowed this regulatory mode in his policy. 09 Nevertheless, the StZG
was criticized as adding problems in practice rather than resolving
controversies related to HESC research." 0 One problem with the
StZG is that the difference in policy within and outside of Germa-
ny's geographical boundaries may be viewed as a double standard.
Importing HESC could be viewed as "a convenient solution allow-
ing for the protection of the life of German embryos to remain un-
diminished while German scientists are enabled to act in an oppor-
tunistic manner, profiting from the destruction of embryos in other
countries.""' Another problem is that the StZG's rule that embry-
onic stem cells must have been extracted before January 200212
introduced the risk of contamination with mouse viruses." 3 Addi-
tionally, allowing derivation of imported HESC is still, to some
extent, condoning the destruction of the embryos. 14 Considering
these restrictive clauses, StZG could merely be a temporary buffer
in this scientific and moral conflict.
109. On August 9, 2001, President Bush announced federal funds could only
be used in the following circumstances: "the derivation process (which begins
with the destruction of the embryo) was initiated prior to 9:00 P.M. EDT on
August 9, 2001; the stem cells must have been derived from an embryo that was
created for reproductive purposes and was no longer needed; informed consent
must have been obtained for the donation of the embryo and that donation must
not have involved financial inducements." Human Embryonic Stem Cell Policy
under former President Bush. See,
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/2001policy.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
110. Minou Bernadette Friele, The Case of German Stem Cell Laws: Trans-
national Cooperation and National Legislation (2005), available at,
http://www.hinxtongroup.org/autransrefs.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
111. Samantha Halliday, A Comparative Approach to the Regulation of Hu-
man Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Europe, 12 MED. L. REv. 40-69 (2004).
112. This key date was chosen to ensure that no HESC lines are directly pro-
duced for German research. The German Parliament made use of this loophole
to establish the 2002 Stem Cell Act. See Peter M Wiedemann, Judith Simon,
Silke Schicktanz & Christof Tannert, The Future of Stem Cell Research in Ger-
many, 5 EMBO REP. 927-931.
113. Successful culturing of human stem cells without mouse contamination
occurred in 2003, but German scientists are only allowed to use human stem
cells created before 2002. See Minou Bernadette Friele, The Case of German
Stem Cell Laws, Transnational Cooperation, and National Legislation (2005).
114. See Morgan, supra note 55.
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b. Case Oliver Brustle v Greenpeace - The Patentability of
Neuronal Precursor Cells
The case Oliver Brustle v. Greenpeace involved the validity of a
patent regarding the Neuronal Precursor Cell.115 In 1997, the patent
granted to German neuroscientist Brustle claimed that the inven-
tion "isolated and purified neural precursor cells, processes for
their production from embryonic stem cells, and the use of neural
precursor cells for the treatment of neural defects." ' 16 After the Di-
rective was issued, in 2004, Greenpeace sued for the revocation of
the patent because neural precursor cells are harvested from human
embryonic stem cells and that based on section 2 of German Patent
Law (GPL), the patent should be withdrawn." 7 In 2005, German
Patent Law was changed to maintain consistency with the Di-
rective. Thus, the core issue of this case changed to clearly eluci-
date Article 6(2) of the Directive in Germany's jurisdiction. The
German Federal Patent Court (GFPC) ruled that the national patent
conflicted with Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive, which prohibited
patents on human embryos for industrial or commercial use. "8 No-
tably, the corresponding patent filed in the EU was granted by the
EPO before this ruling. 19 The German patent was dismissed, and
115. Defined by Mr. Brustle in written observation, Neuronal Precursor Cells
are 'immature cells which are capable of forming mature nervous system cells,
such as neurons', see Oliver Brustle v. Greenpeace C-34/10.
116. The German Patent DE 197 56 864; Oliver Brustle v. Greenpeace C-
34/10.
117. Section 2(2) of German Patent Act provides that 'patents are especially
not granted for...the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial pur-
posed'. This provision is transferred from Article 6(2)(c) of EU Directive.
German Patent Act §2(2).
118. Martin Grund, Erik Richly and Stacey J Farmer, The German Federal
Patent Court Confronts the Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 8
Bioscience L.R. 1-4 (2007) (stating that the court has essentially rewritten the
existing law to thereby impose a more stringent standard on patentability on
embryonic stem cell technology than is actually required. In essence, by invok-
ing the principles of order public, the GFPC has wrongfully excluded subject
matter from patent protection that could otherwise be legitimately exploited un-
der German law).
119. Schneider Ingrid, The ECJ Judgment 'Bruestle v. Greenpeace' C-34/10;
Importance and Implications for Europe, 3 INTELL. PROP. J. 475-510 (2011).
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Mr. Brustle then appealed to the German Federal High Court of
Justice (GFHCJ). 20
The GFHCJ decided to submit the case to the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) and specifically asked for an interpretation of Article
6 of the Directive:
(1) What is meant by the term "human embryos" in
Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44? (2) What is
meant by the expression "uses of human embryos
for industrial or commercial purposes"? Does it in-
clude any commercial exploitation within the mean-
ing of Article 6(1) of [Directive 98/44], especially
use for the purposes of scientific research? (3) Is
technical teaching to be considered unpatentable
pursuant to Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive even if
the use of human embryos does not form part of the
technical teaching claimed with the patent, but is a
necessary precondition for the application of that
teaching? 21
Answering the first question, the ECJ, referred to the preceding
case Monsanto v. Cefetra, 122 which held that the Directive left al-
most no room for the discretion of national law. '23According to
Recital 16 of the Directive124 , "human embryos" cover all stages
"from the fertilization stage to the initial totipotent cells and to the
entire ensuing process of the development and formation of the
120. Id.
121. Oliver Brustle v. Greenpeace, C-34/10 at 35.
122. Monsanto v. Cefetra, C-428/08, para. 48 (providing that the body of
rules established in Directive 98/44 is not complete, but must be deemed to be
exhaustive in the area with which it deals. The corollary being that, in those ar-
eas, national legislation cannot provide for a level of patent protection wider
than that provided for under the directive).
123. See Ingrid, supra note 119.
124. Recital 16 of the Directive provides that 'it is important to assert the
principle that the human body, at any stage in its formation or development, in-
cluding germ cells, and the simple discovery of one of its elements or one of its
products, including the sequence or partial sequence of a human gene, cannot be
patented'.
23
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human body."'25 The blastocyst and unfertilized ova are both in-
cluded in the concept of "human embryos". 12 6 However, pluripo-
tent embryonic stem cells, with no potential to become human be-
ings, are excluded from the definition of "human embryos" under
Article 6(2)(c).'27 In terms of the second question, in accordance
with the human dignity principle of the Directive, therapeutic or
diagnostic uses are legitimate exceptions to non-patentable "uses
of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes". 128 With
regard to the last question, the ECJ took the view that the descrip-
tion should be treated as an integral part. If obtaining neuron pre-
cursor cells entails the inevitable destruction of human embryos,
patents must not be granted to the invention even if its claims do
not contain any use of human embryos.129
As discussed in the previous case studies, the ECJ's ruling is
undeniably similar to that of the EBA in terms of problems with
patentability. Christopher Heath explained that if the ECJ has a
different interpretation from that of the EBA, this would bring an
uncomfortable situation; namely, "the national courts would be
bound by the ECJ in interpreting the patentability of national pa-
tents, whilst EBA would be bound by the EBA decision in deter-
mining patentability of a European patent application or European
patent in appeal proceedings."'3
3. Intermediate Approach.- Netherland Policy
An intermediate approach between permissiveness and prohibi-
tion is usually the result of political and commercial balancing.
One significant characteristic of this approach is that while embry-
os created for research are forbidden, surplus embryos from IVF
are allowed. This approach, to some extent, has the effects of pro-





130. Christopher Heath, Case Comment, Germany: German Patent Act, §2;
European Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions,
Art.6(2)(c)-"Neural Precursor Cells/Brustle's Patent" (Neurale Vorlaufer-
zellen), 41 INT'L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION LAW 853-857 (2010).
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tecting human dignity and providing a safe environment for HESC
research. Therefore, most European countries have formally
adopted this approach.' However, policies made based upon this
approach are "at risk of being ambiguous and internally incon-
sistent."'32 This approach is well developed in the Netherlands.
a. Health Council Report on The Dutch Embryo Act: An
Embryo Created for Research was Not Allowed
Similar to the Warnock report in the UK, a report by the Health
Council provided advice on emerging IVF. Compared with the
Warnock report, the Council agreed with the fourteen-day limit on
permissible embryos in research.' 3 However, the Council distin-
guished "the spare embryo" from IVF with embryos created for re-
search. 34 Then, in a discussion about instrumental and non-
instrumental uses of human embryos,'35 the council expressed the
view that human embryos could not be used or created for re-
search. 3 6 The Christian Democratic Party (CDA) published a re-
port entitled "Meaningful Life" that opposed any instrumental uses
of human embryos. 137 The report stated that "respect and protection
of human life, irrespective of its developmental stage or manifesta-
tion, should be the cornerstone of our [Dutch] legal order."'3 8
131. Charles Kessler, European Policies and Priorities for stem cell re-
search, Remedie Project (2009), available at,
http://www.york.ac.uk/res/sci/events/FinalConfPres/Kessler.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2015).
132. Rosario M Isasi & Bartha M Knoppers, Towards Commonality? Policy
Approaches to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Europe, in Plomer Au-
roar & Paul Torremans, EMBRYONIC STEM CELL PATENTS: EUROPEAN LAW AND
ETHICS, 1st ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009).
133. Gezondheidsraad (The Health Council), Interimadviesinzake IVF (s'-
Gravenhage: Gezondheldsraad, 1984).
134. Id.
135. In this debate, instrumental use referred to use for research, whereas
non-instrumental use was use for reproductive aims (such as IVF).
136. Marta Kirejczyk, Parliamentary Cultures and Human Embryos: The
Dutch and British Debates Compared, 29 SOC. STUD. SC. 889-912 (1999).
137. The Christian Democratic Party, http://jonjayray.1 10mb.com/apr05.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
138. Id.
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This issue was hotly debated and the Dutch Embryos Act was
ultimately passed in 2002. In the Act, the research use of supernu-
merary embryos is permitted within a three to five-year moratori-
um. 39 An embryo is described as "a cell or a complex of cells with
the capacity to develop into a human being."'140 Due to a declara-
tion that only cloning of a person is forbidden, Cell Nuclear Re-
placement (CNR) 141 is permitted by the Dutch Embryos Act be-
cause it is merely involved with human cells provided that it
satisfied all other provisions in the Act. 42 Additionally, the Dutch
Embryos Act specifically listed legitimate purposes for research
involving human embryos. 143 The Dutch Embryos Act was viewed
as a compromise between moral objections to creating embryos for
research use and potential benefits to certain categories of re-
search.'"
III. US: LIBERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITH VARIOUS REGULATION
IN THE STATES
Regulation of HESC operates at the federal and state levels of
government. In general, the US has a liberal environment and has
139. Dutch Embryo Act §32 (2002). Section 32 provides that "within three
years of this Act entering into force, and every four years there-after, our Minis-
ter shall send a report to Parliament concerning its effectiveness and impact in
practice."
140. Dutch Embryo Act §1 (2002).
141. This involves removing the DNA from an embryo and replacing it with
the DNA from a cell removed from an individual. The embryo is then implanted
in a woman's womb and allowed to develop into a new human with DNA is






kUgflJMOR&icp= 1 &.intl=us&sig=Nt44ZRqj lkpidHh08.Q (last visited Feb.
22, 2015).
142. Supra, note 76.
143. Dutch Embryo Act § 8 (2002).
144. Supra, note 76.
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no uniform HESC regulation at the federal level. 45 Because the
federal government has precluded coordinated efforts in HESC re-
search area, each state developed its own regulations.146 The HESC
legal framework varies on one fundamental dimension: whether to
permit or prohibit HESC research. 147 Some states widely permit
HESC research, including somatic cell transfer, 148 while others do
not explicitly prohibit reproductive cloning. 149 A small handful of
states have restrictive policies on HESC research. 150 Thus, harmo-
nizing the divergent HESC laws among the federal and state gov-
ernments is important.
A. Regulation Vacuum at the Federal Level
To pursue a competitive position in the HESC market, the legis-
lation at the federal level in US is a vacuum.'5 ' Moral opposition
seems to have little impact on patenting inventions related to
HESC research in the United States. In light of prior rulings,
HESC could not be patented due to morality issues; however, in
1980, the Supreme Court of the United States opened the door to
granting patents on "non-naturally occurring living substances" in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty. 5 Since the Diamond ruling, thousands
of genes, animals, and living materials were granted patents. In
145. Arif Jamil, Human Stem Cell Research in Europe and the USA: Post
Brustle and Sherley, Ethics Issues and Patent Quagmire, 2 NTUT J. OF INTELL.
PROP. L. &MGMT 145-166 (2013).
146. Geoffrey P Lomax, Erik J Forsberg, Dan Gincel, Debra S Grega, Melis-
sa J Lopes, Caroline J Marshall, Stefan Winkler and Warren Wollschlager, Poli-
cy Harmonization through Collaboration: The Interstate Alliance on Stem Cell
Research, World Stem Cell Report 100-105 (2010), available at, lttp://nas-
sites.org/iascr/files/2013/01/LomaxIASCR_2010_publication.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2015).
147. See Hughes, supra note 2.
148. E.g., New Jersey, California, Illinois.
149. E.g., Arkansas, Virginia.
150. E.g., Oklahoma.
151. See Plomer, supra note 125 (concluding that the United States does not
have uniform state level laws and policies for human stem cell research and pa-
tent, but there are fewer complexities than in Europe).
152. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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1987, the United States Patent Office issued a notice clarifying that
living organisms are patentable subject matter. 5 3
The United States Patent and Trademark Office Board (USPTO)
of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) then shed further light
on patenting human beings in 1987, explaining that "a claim di-
rected to, or including within its scope, a human being will not be
considered to be patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C §
101. 1 4 The rationale behind the above explanation to the exclu-
sion of the patentability is that patenting human life is similar to
slavery. "I However, in 1998, the first human embryonic stem cell
patent was granted with little moral objection. 156 Nevertheless, the
USPTO declared that "inventions directed towards human/non-
human chimeras could, under certain circumstances, not be patent-
able because, among other things, they would fail to meet the pub-
lic policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement."', 57 Ac-
cording to Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang'58, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Patent Office
should not play a role in determining whether an invention is mor-
al. 59
The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act addressed the low utilization rate of
government-owned patents. 160 This Act, sponsored by two sena-
153. Notice: Animals Patentability, US Patent and Trademark Office, re-
printed in 1077 Official Gazette Patent and Trademark Office (April 7, 1987),
see MPEP 2105, Patentable Subject Matter- Living Subject Matter [R-08.2012],
available at, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2105.html (last visit-
ed Feb. 22, 2015).
154. Id.
155. Iwasaka Ryan, From Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for
Evolutionary Biology in Patent Law, 109 YALE L. J. 1505 (2000).
156. David B Resnik, Embryonic Stem Cell Patents and Human Dignity, 15
HEALTH CARE ANAL. 211-222 (2007).
157. Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a Relationship to Human, Media
Advisory, US Patent and Trademark Office, (April 1, 1998).
158. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.1999).
159. Id. (In this case, a patent was in dispute. Juicy Whip sued Orange Bang
for patent infringement. The court held that patent lacked utility and was there-
fore unpatentable.)
160. Wendy H. Schacht, Cong. Research Serv., RL32076, The Bayh-Dole
Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy and the Commercialization of Technology
28
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss1/3
2014] HUMANEMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 81
tors, Birch Bayh of Indiana and Bob Dole of Kansas, was codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 200-212.161 The Bayh-Dole Act contains march-in
provisions 162 that could assure the commercial rights of grantees.63
(2012), available at, https://www.autm.net/BayhDole Act Report.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2015).
161. The Bayh-Dole Act, § 200, P.L.96-517. The Bayh-Dole Act purpose is
to use "the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from
federally supported research or development, and to promote collaboration be-
tween commercial concerns and non-profit organizations, including universi-
ties."
162. March-in Right means while a contractor has the right to retain the
rights to the invention, in the event the contactor chooses not to get a patent, the
government is able to secure a patent if it is given the disclosures in a timely
manner. See Steven E Feldman & Sherry L Rollo, Emerging Energy and Intel-
lectual Property: The Often Unappreciated Risks and Hurdles of Government
Regulations and Standard Setting Organizations, HUSCH BLACKWELL
(2012), available at, http://www.natlawreview.com/article/emerging-energy-
and-intellectual-property-often-unappreciated-risks-and-hurdles-gove (last visit-
ed Feb, 22. 2015).
163. 35 USC §203(a) states that;
[w]ith respect to any subject invention in which a small busi-
ness firm or nonprofit organization has acquired title under
this chapter, the Federal agency under whose funding agree-
ment the subject invention was made shall have the right, in
accordance with such procedures as are provided in regula-
tions promulgated hereunder to require the contractor, an as-
signee or exclusive licensee of a subject invention to grant a
nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license in any
field of use to a responsible applicant or applicants, upon
terms that are reasonable under the circumstances, and if the
contractor, assignee, or exclusive licensee refuses such re-
quest, to grant such a license itself, if the Federal agency de-
termines that such-(1) action is necessary because the con-
tractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take
within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical
application of the subject invention in such field of use; (2)
action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which
are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or
their licensees; (3) action is necessary to meet requirements
for public use specified by Federal regulations and such re-
quirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, as-
signee, or licensees; or (4) action is necessary because the
agreement required by section has not been obtained or
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Aided by the Bayh-Dole Act, universities and small businesses,
rapidly established technology transfer groups, and introduced ex-
perts in patenting inventions. 164 The Bayh-Dole Act was widely
viewed as a success, bringing new technologies to the public.'65
The Act aims to "give grantee inventors, and those with whom
they contract, a reasonable degree of certainty."'' 66 In terms of
HESC research, a system based on the "Bayh-Dole Model" was
created following the successes of California and Wisconsin. 167 In
this system, there were attempts to place stem cell lines in the pub-
lic domain, which made them accessible to stem cell repositories
or banks.
Based on the "Bayh Dole Model", there was patent inflation in
the HESC area. President George W. Bush conveyed his worry
over "human embryo farms" in a 2002 speech 16 and urged the
United States' Senate to approve a total ban on the cloning of hu-
man embryos. 69 When the USPTO faced an application for a pa-
tent on a cloned or genetically modified human embryo, it applied
the substantive part of the US Patent Law, Title 35 of the United
State Code, under which an invention is patentable if it satisfies
patentable subject matter, which requires a showing the subject
waived or because a licensee of the exclusive right to use or
sell any subject invention in the United States is in breach of
its agreement obtained pursuant to section.
164. Michael S Mireles, States as Innovation System Laboratories: Califor-
nia, Patents and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133-1159 (2006).
165. See Ann L. Gisolfi and Anthony M. Insogna, States Fund Stem Cell Re-
search, THE NATIONAL L. J., (June 13, 2005) available at,
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/3d2ce75f-3c86-4df2-976e-
731 d78366ece/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/00f6d72 1 -ba2c-4178-bd0e-
7995ef146491/stemcell_05132005.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2015); see also
Plomer, supra, note 14.
166. See Hughes, supra, note 2.
167. Id.
168. Using cloning technology, scientists could create billions of unfertilized
human embryos for research or therapeutic use, called "human embryo farms".
See Bush Backs Ban on Human Cloning, abcnews.com, July 30, 2002,
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matter is novel, non-obvious and utilitarian. 70 Back in 1980, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court opened the door to granting
patents on "non-naturally occurring living substances" in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty.'7' Since then, thousands of genes, animals, and
other living materials have been the subjects of patent protection.
Some scientists hope that patents will be granted for human em-
bryos so that scientists will have the exclusive right to license oth-
ers and collect royalty fees. Alta Charo, a supporter of human em-
bryo patents from University of Wisconsin, highlighted the fact
that "investors hope for a return on their original investment with
the basic research, but with no patent, there is no return."
1 72
Meanwhile, other experts hold differing views from Charo.
Congressman Dave Weldon, for example, believes "no one should
be able to own a human being at any stage of development."' 73
Similarly, the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) chair-
man, Douglas Johnson, commented that "a member of the human
family can never be regarded as a mere invention or as intellectual
property."' 7 4 In addition, Dave Weldon pointed out that "no one
should be able to own a human being at any stage of development.
Congress has never spoken on this issue, and I felt it was past time
we did."'175 With Weldon's support, for the first time ever, Con-
gress enacted the Weldon Amendment, which contained in annual
170. 35 USC § 101; 35 USC § 102; 35 USC § 103.
171. Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (The application asserted 36 claims related to
Chakrabarty's invention of a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas containing
therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids. The patent examiner al-
lowed the claims falling into the first two categories but rejected claims for the
bacteria. His decision rested on two grounds: (1) that micro-organisms are prod-
ucts of nature and (2) that as living things they are not patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
172. Congress Bans Patents on Human Embryos NRLC-backed Weldon
Amendment Survive BIO Attacks, NRLC Federal Legislation (2004), available
at,
http://www.nrlc.org/archive/KillingEmbryos/HumanPatenting/WeldonAmend
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Commerce, Justice and Science Appropriation bills 76, in 2004.
The Weldon Amendment banned patents on human embryos for
the first time. Section 518 of the Weldon Amendment states "None
of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this
Act may be used to issue patents on claims directed to or encom-
passing a human organism."'77 On September 16, 2011, the Wel-
don Amendment, which was included in the America Invents Act
(AIA), became an integral part of US patent law.'78 Granting a pa-
tent for a human embryo is permanently prohibited in the United
States under section 33 of the AIA, which states that 'no patent
may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organ-
ism'.
179
HESC regulation at the federal level remains a vacuum under
the Bayh-Dole regime and the Weldon Amendment. The United
States' position toward HESC is liberal in regard to patent protec-
tion. There is no uniform regulation of procurement of embryos or
the use of HESC lines at the federal level. Despite that a vacuum
in HESC regulation harmonization of the federal level, it is also
noticeable many states have regulated to compensate for the lack
of federal law. A case in point is the model for state involvement
in California.
176. See Codify the Weldon Ban on Patenting Humans, Legislative Action
Arm of Family Research Council, available at,
http://downloads.frcaction.org/EF/EFlIF02.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
(Stating that Congress has each year since 2004 passed the Weldon Amendment
to prevent any profiting from patents on humans. The Weldon Amendment re-
stricts funds under the Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations bill from be-
ing used by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to issue patents di-
rected to "human organisms").
177. Alan Fram, Panel Oks Anti-Abortion Provision, THE WASHINGTON
POST (July 14 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49778-
2004Jull4.html.
178. Jeremy Kryn, Amendment Banning Human Embryo Patents Becomes
Permanent US Law, LifeSiteNews.com, (September 20 2011), available at,
http://www.lifesitenews.corn/news/congress-makes-amendment-banning-
human-embryo-patents-permanent/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
179. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29 (2011).
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B. Filling the Vacuum at the State Level - Considering California
Considering the sizeable tax and other benefits from the HESC
industry, some states have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the
United States, each state can have its own sets of definitions, rules,
and regulations to a certain extent. 80 Certain states draw distinc-
tions based on the source of the stem cells or add restrictions based
on the purpose for which the research is conducted, while other
states have yet to decide what HESC research to allow and what
research to restrict. Many states are proposing new regulations;
however, in states that appear to have already settled on a position,
HESC policies are still in considerable flux.
In 2004, 59.1 percent of the California electorate endorsed
Proposition 71, also known as the Stem Cell Research and Cures
Act 2004 (California). This Act appeared to be a victory for scien-
tists and research funding. 8 ' Proposition 71 was proposed as a re-
sponse to the George W. Bush administration's restrictive policy
on HESC research. Based on this Act, a new state medical research
institute, the Californian Institute for Regenerative Medicine, was
established and three billion dollars in state general obligation
bonds was authorized to fund stem cell research and research facil-
ities in California. 182
The California Stem Cell Research and Cures Bond Act of 2004
(Proposition 71) is worth reading closely, not only because Cali-
fornia was the world's largest single backer of HESC research, but
180. See Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112 § 12 J (a) I; Michigan,
Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2685 (1); Minnesota, Min. Stat. § 145.422; North Da-
kota, N.D.Cent. Code § 14-02.2-01 (1); Pennsylvania, Pa. Cons. Stat. tit 18. §
3216 (a); Rhode Island, R.J.Gen. Laws § 11-54-1(a); South Dakota,
S.D.Codified Laws §§ 34-14-16, 34-14-17.
181. Elle Dolgin, Stem Cells: The Impatient Advocate, 468 NATURE 620-623
(2010). (The approval of proposition 71 was mainly due to the efforts of Robert
Klein, a California real estate developer whose son had juvenile diabetes. Klein
used his huge wealth to underwrite Proposition 71 's campaign and made a tre-
mendous contribution to drafting and financing Proposition 71).
182. MATTHEW RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
BIOLOGICAL INVENTIONS, 60-390 (Edward Elgar, Gheltenham 2007) (observing
that Californian voters were upset that such funding of stem cell research could
be hampered by patents).
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also because it received strong moral opposition from religious
Christian representatives.' 83 This new legal model challenged the
standard way in which public policy was formulated at the federal
level. This new legal model also warranted a close examination
and enabled voters to amend the law directly. Although many peo-
ple believe that more direct democracy always leads to better poli-
cy, Proposition 71 might not support that belief'8 4 First, nominal
democratic procedure may lack democratic checks and democrati-
cally elected institutions.'85 Second, democratic procedure may
lead to deficiencies in decision making, representation, and public
accountability which will be a common thread linking specific
problems. 6 Third, the democratic decision through ballot may
transfer power to money interest. 18 7
Despite that, there are more lessons to be learned from Proposi-
tion 71.188 For example, Proposition 71 resulted in the circumven-
tion of critical basic policy processes and the balkanization of re-
search. It also concentrated too much power in a small group. 18 9
The lack of federal funding has discouraged scientists from enter-
ing HESC research. Proposition 71 successfully fills the gap left
by the lack of US federal funding. It uses an approach called obli-
gation bonds, which are normally used in funding brick and mortar
projects, to finance the HESC research. Proposition 71 created the
California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM). 190 CIRM
183. On November 2, 2004, California voters passed the California Stem
Cell Research and Cures Bond Act of 2004.
184. Eileen Burgin, Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Proposition 71, 29
POL. & LIFE Sci. 73 (2010) (noting that Proposition 71 is the outcome of direct




188. Donna Gerardi Riordan, Research Funding via Direct Democracy: Is it
Good for Science? Issues in Science and Technology (Nov. 27, 2013) available
at, http://www.issues.org/24.4/priordan.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
189. Id.
190. The California Institute for Regenerative Medicine,
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015), (providing grants and loads
for stem cell research, research facilities, and other vital research opportunities
to realize therapies and establishing the appropriate regulatory standards of
oversight bodies for research and facilities development).
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expanded the licensing authority under the Bayh-Dole regime,
which is limited to "any contractor who is a non-profit research in-
stitution or a small business."'19 Based on Bayh-Dole, CIRM re-
served the right of the funding agency and the march-in right. This
new method has attracted both national and international research-
ers.
Although Proposition 71 is a huge success, it has significant de-
ficiencies, especially its lack of clarity. For example, it does not
state an adequate return on investment for taxpayers. Proposition
71 does not specify any social benefit for the public from HESC
research. 92 Worse, Proposition 71 authorizes the spending of three
million dollars, but does not specify any evaluation system for the
results of the invested HESC research. There is also a growing
concern over the conflict between the licensing regime under
Bayh-Dole and CIRM regulations. Moreover, the federal re-
strictions in the United States on funding HESC research led to in-
consistent and perhaps unduly costly state funding mechanisms for
HESC research.
However, Proposition 71 is California's answer to the federal re-
striction, and is developing policies to ensure that HESC research
is conducted under the highest medical and moral standards.193 An
economic analysis concluded that Proposition 71 may generate
economic benefits for California and global society. 94 In the con-
text of the vacuum at the federal level, Proposition 71 attempts to
fill the gap between science and politics at the state level.
191. See Bayh-Dole Act, NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 5 (1980) (codified as 37
U.S.C.A. 200-212).
192. Supra, note 36.
193. Zach W Hall, Stem Cell Research in California: The intersection of Sci-
ence, Politics, Culture andLaw, 10 MINN. J. L. SCl. & TECH. 1-18 (2008).
194. Laurence Baker and Bruce Deal, Economic Impact Analysis Proposi-
tion, 71 California Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative, Analysis Group
Economic Financial and Strategy Consultants (2004), available at,
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/News andEvents/News/Proposit
ion 71 report.pdf(last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
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C. The Interstate Alliance on Stem Cell Research (IASCR): A
Venue for the States to Cooperate
The varying policies on the derivation and use HESC lines
threaten cooperative attempts between states. 195 The IASCR was
established to "advance stem cell research by fostering effective
interstate collaboration, by assisting states in developing research
programs, and by promoting efficient and responsible use of public
funds has achieved important milestones."'196 The IASCR aims to
"identify and increase opportunities for interstate collaboration,
identify and decrease obstacles to collaborative research across
state lines, and assist states that wish to develop or improve upon
public funding programs in this area.' ' 9
7
Efforts by the IASCR center on two areas: to (1) "identify poli-
cies that spur economic development" and (2) "facilitate inter-
jurisdictional collaborative partnerships".'98 As described, the
IASCR may vertically integrate relevant regulations and blunt
some sharp differences in research policies. 9 9 For example, the
IASCR is crucial to the cooperation of Ohio and Maryland. 00 The
195. Dan Vergano, States Dive into Stem Cell Debates, USA TODAY,(April
20, 2004), available at, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-04-
20-stem-cell-cover x.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (stating that there is a tre-
mendous amount of legislation flying around on one area of medical research. It
is remarkable and unprecedented. Legislative activity in various states will lead
to a "crazy-quilt" pattern of laws that will drive some scientists to states that
support the research).
196. Geoffrey P Lomax, Erik J Forsberg, Dan Gincel, Debra S Grega, Melis-
sa J Lopes, Caroline J Marshall, Stefan Winkler and Warren Wollschlager, Poli-
cy Harmonization through Collaboration. The Interstate Alliance on Stem Cell





199. Insoo Hyun, The Bioethics of Stem Cell Research and Therapy 120 J.
CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 71-75 (2010).
200. See Burgin, supra, note 184. (Stating that Maryland and Ohio are both
members of the Interstate Alliance for Stem Cell Research, which has provided
a forum for exchange and cooperation across state lines. The two states have
taken different approaches to a similar goal of driving biotechnology economic
development. The IASCR provided a unique forum for support during program
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IASCR also supports the development of private-public partner-
ships, such as the New York Stem Cell Foundation (NYSCF). 0
Moreover, the IASCR promotes state investment in HESC re-
search. State policy makers in Connecticut, for example, approved
a ten-year, one hundred million dollar funding program in June
2005; and, lawmakers in New Jersey, Illinois, and Maryland have
allocated state funds to support research in the field. Altogether,
policy makers from at least fifteen states have expressed interest in
supporting stem cell research. 02
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As discussed, in HESC, hundreds of flowers bloom on multiple
jurisdictional levels. This article observed that the European Union
patent regulations contain moral opposition to HESC, while the
United States has no such clause. The European Union tradition
values bioethics and is rooted in moral values,203 whereas the Unit-
ed States tradition does not share these characteristics. 20 4 In par-
ticular, there is a difference in the patentability and morality of
HESC related invention across borders. The invention that obtains
patent protection in one area might be objected to in other areas.
development in both states. IASCR plays an important role in allowing partici-
pants, such as Ohio and Maryland, foster collaborative agreements, exchange
models to support economic development, and share methodologies for evaluat-
ing impact, thus building on the success of the Maryland and Ohio programs to
other states' initiatives.)
201. Id.
202. Supra, note 67.
203. Brian Salter, Bioethics, Politics and the Moral Economy of Human Em-
bryonic Stem Cell Science: The Case of the European Union 's Sixth Framework
Programme, 26 NEw GENETICS & SOC'Y 269-288 (2007). (Indicating that the
EU modes of ethics engagement become a political technology that constitutes a
permanent feature of the new cultural politics as mechanisms are sought that
will enable the refining, manipulating, resolving and legitimating of cultural dif-
ferences).
204. David B Resnik, Embryonic Stem Cell Patents and Human Dignity, 15
HEALTH CARE ANAL. 211-222 (2007). (Observing that patent examiners focus
on technical questions conceming novelty, non-obviousness, utility, and disclo-
sure, while the courts focus on policy questions related to economic develop-
ment, competition, and scientific and technical innovation).
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This regulatory inconsistency leads to the phenomenon whereby
scientists, research funding and patients flow to the area that has a
liberal policy in HESC research. The problem of unequal access to
therapies resulting from HESC is likely to arise due to the dispari-
ties in regulatory conditions.
When we view the HESC regulation regime in a long-term his-
torical background in EU, HESC related inventions cannot be pa-
tented in the presence of morality objections in the EU. To ensure
efficiency and effectiveness, cultural, ethical and legal harmoniza-
tion is indispensable. However, the moral-exclusion-fits-all ap-
proach of the EU Directive is not likely to yield the best result in
the member states, which differ widely in social and cultural reali-
ties. For example, according to the liberal policy in the UK, the re-
strictive policy in the German and the intermediate in the Dutch,
the member states had different interpretations towards moral def-
inition, human embryo definition and industrial or commercial use
definition. This inconsistency does not conform to the harmoniza-
tion aims of the EPC and Biotechnology Directive. Legal reconcil-
iation is essential, whereas legal diversity is inevitable.
Therefore, the harmonized legal framework cannot conclusively
determine the adoption mode of member states. Contrarily, contin-
uing diversity at the national level may promote research and de-
velopment in the field of HESC. A case in point is the United
States. Governmental policymaker in US that allows hundreds of
opinions to be heard on multiple jurisdictional levels in the field of
HESC research. Although there is a lack of federal regulation to-
ward HESC research, regulations in the states such as Proposition
71 compensate for the lack of federal regulation. In other words,
the diverse regulations at the state level fill the vacuum at the fed-
eral level.
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